Quote:
Originally Posted by randolph
So let me get this "straight".
An injunctive relief is an extraordinary and drastic remedy. A declaratory judgment is the functional equivalent of a injunction (sort of).
Since the law is not yet in effect, there can be no "relief". The final determination will have to be made by the Supreme Court.
Also, since the law was created and passed by Congress and has become law, it is out of the hands of the Executive Branch. A judges ruling on the Constitutionality of the law would apply to the Congress not the Executive Branch.
So Congress is where the law must be straightened out.
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The bill was written without the usual "separability" clause that makes it possible for a judge to rule on parts of a law that is challenged rather than on the entire law. This may or may not have been done deliberately (that is a separate discussion). Hence, the judge's ruling is on the entire law.
He could have chosen to STOP the law's implementation immediately by issuing an injunction. He did not. There are arguments among lawyers and talking heads about the judge's intent, but it is clear that however he may define various words, he did not enjoin the government from its immediate implementation of the law, which he could have done and which he could have made clear.
The Justice Department considers the ruling to be a declarative one that allows for the implementation of the law as the case makes its way higher, to the Supreme Court (remember, the individual mandate does not go into effect until 2014). Some of the states that have sued the federal government consider the ruling to be more than declarative, and are clamoring for the immediate halt to implementation.
It is notable that the judge has NOT changed his ruling. It would be easy for a state that thinks he ruled to enjoin the law and stop its implementation immediately to go back to his court and ask for him to make this clear. That has not happened, precisely for the reason I stated earlier. Judge Vinson is acting in accord with the spirit of the statutes and his judicial authority. He seems to be recognizing the absurdity of enjoining something that hasn't yet gone into effect (in other words, how can you stop something that hasn't yet started?). And, by virtue of his statement in the ruling quoted by Randolph earlier, he recognizes the political reality that there are provisions in the law that, to stop their implementation (e.g., the provision that disallows an insurance company from denying coverage for a pre-existing condition), would not only wreak havoc but -- he implies -- are probably constitutional (remember, this bill lacked the "separability" clause).
Vinson may be an "activist judge" -- as some proponents of the law have claimed -- but he surely is no dummy.