I have a serious intellectual question.

[tslust]

All that talk about Hitler on the political landscape thread has me thinking about the wehrmacht inWorld War II.

Given the fact that Germany was not capibable of wining a drawn out war on so many fronts (the Atlantic, the air war, the Mediterranean, North Africa) at that point in time; what do you think that Germany's culliminating point of victory was?

[smc]

All that talk about Hitler on the political landscape thread has me thinking about the wehrmacht inWorld War II.

Given the fact that Germany was not capibable of wining a drawn out war on so many fronts (the Atlantic, the air war, the Mediterranean, North Africa) at that point in time; what do you think that Germany's culliminating point of victory was?

Please clarify your question. What do you mean (or how do you mean) culminating in this context?

[franalexes]

Ditto to smc's question.
I would submit that world domination is self defeating. If you conquer the world then you become a blend of the world. If you are a blend of the world then you have lost your identity.

[tslust]

Please clarify your question. What do you mean (or how do you mean) culminating in this context?

I've read from multiple sources saying that the failures at Stalingrad, Kursk or even Normady were the "death nail" Wehrmacht. I believe it was the failure to capture Moscow, in 1941.

[smc]

I've read from multiple sources saying that the failures at Stalingrad, Kursk or even Normady were the "death nail" Wehrmacht. I believe it was the failure to capture Moscow, in 1941.

Okay, so you mean culminating point of defeat, not victory? If that's true, you can understand the confusion.

I'm no military expert, but it has always seemed to me that the failure of the Nazis militarily cannot be attributed to any one event, and hence there is no specific "point" to which defeat can be attributed (unless you want to be hypertechnical and ascribe that to the official moment of surrender).

I agree with you that one of the most important turning points in the war (yes, a turning point despite how early it came) has to do with the Soviet Union, but I'm not sure it's the failure to capture Moscow in 1941. Rather, I think it was the defeat of the Nazis by the Red Army in the Battle of Stalingrad, ending in February 1943.

The Germans had to devote enormous resources to this battle, which waged from late August 1942, and suffered tremendous losses of its fighting force. After this defeat, the Germans were unable to win a single important victory on the war's Eastern front.

However, the importance of this defeat wasn't strictly measured by specific military losses, in my opinion. I think the Germans were very demoralized by the fact that despite holding 90 percent of the city, they couldn't beat the Russian holdouts in building-to-building conflict. It wasn't lost on German rank-and-file soldiers that the Russians were fighting for something they believed in -- the defense of their nation (despite the rapidly and increasingly hated Stalinist bureaucracy at its helm) -- whereas the Germans were all conscripts and increasingly saw themselves as cannon fodder.

[violet lightning]

If Hitler hadn't invaded Russia or started the Battle of Britain (the precurser to Operation Sea Lion-the German invasion of Britain) he might have acheived "victory" by keeping what he had conquered up until then. (virtually all of Europe, North Africa, etc) Hitler didn't relish invading Britain, so its possible that they might have reached an agreement or stalemate at least.
After Dunkirk, the Brits and Allies (before the US joined) were pretty beaten up. (But of course not defeated)

[smc]

If Hitler hadn't invaded Russia or started the Battle of Britain (the precurser to Operation Sea Lion-the German invasion of Britain) he might have acheived "victory" by keeping what he had conquered up until then. (virtually all of Europe, North Africa, etc) Hitler didn't relish invading Britain, so its possible that they might have reached an agreement or stalemate at least.
After Dunkirk, the Brits and Allies (before the US joined) were pretty beaten up. (But of course not defeated)

Now we are getting into a different realm: how is "victory" defined by the different players.

I believe that for Hitler, despite that he "didn't relish invading Britain," victory was defined by domination and colonization that extended far beyond what he "had conquered up until then."

[tslust]

Okay, so you mean culminating point of defeat, not victory? If that's true, you can understand the confusion.

I'm no military expert, but it has always seemed to me that the failure of the Nazis militarily cannot be attributed to any one event, and hence there is no specific "point" to which defeat can be attributed (unless you want to be hypertechnical and ascribe that to the official moment of surrender).

I agree with you that one of the most important turning points in the war (yes, a turning point despite how early it came) has to do with the Soviet Union, but I'm not sure it's the failure to capture Moscow in 1941. Rather, I think it was the defeat of the Nazis by the Red Army in the Battle of Stalingrad, ending in February 1943.

The Germans had to devote enormous resources to this battle, which waged from late August 1942, and suffered tremendous losses of its fighting force. After this defeat, the Germans were unable to win a single important victory on the war's Eastern front.

However, the importance of this defeat wasn't strictly measured by specific military losses, in my opinion. I think the Germans were very demoralized by the fact that despite holding 90 percent of the city, they couldn't beat the Russian holdouts in building-to-building conflict. It wasn't lost on German rank-and-file soldiers that the Russians were fighting for something they believed in -- the defense of their nation (despite the rapidly and increasingly hated Stalinist bureaucracy at its helm) -- whereas the Germans were all conscripts and increasingly saw themselves as cannon fodder.

I probably should've used the word attack instead of victory. What I was meaning was at what point was it no longer for Hitler to achieve victory and should've begin attempts to sit down and negotiate with the Allies and the Soviets.

Stalingrad was a major turning point. That coupled with the failure in the Caucasus campaign (which was going on during the Stalingrad operations) ment that Army Group South was severly weakend also all the gains in the summer had to be abandoned. It still seems almost preposterous that the handful of Red Army survivors and Chuikov's 62nd Army were able to hold out against the entire German 6th Army. A couple of factors come into play. Firstly, Paulus was not the ideal commander. He was the replacement to Walther von Reichenau (who died of a heart attack) who was by many accounts a far better general. Secondly, when the Luftwaffe bombed Stalingrad to ruble, the Germans were not able to bing their decessive weapon (the tank) into the battle. Lastly, the Soviet defenders were fighting out of desperation. Whereas before, they might have withdrawn in the face of overwhelming German attacks. Stalin's "not a step back" order and the use of blocking attachments to shoot anyone trying to retreat gave the Red Army soldiers two grim choices, stand and fight until killed by the Germans or get shot by their own soldiers.

[smc]

I probably should've used the word attack instead of victory. What I was meaning was at what point was it no longer for Hitler to achieve victory and should've begin attempts to sit down and negotiate with the Allies and the Soviets.

Stalingrad was a major turning point. That coupled with the failure in the Caucasus campaign (which was going on during the Stalingrad operations) ment that Army Group South was severly weakend also all the gains in the summer had to be abandoned. It still seems almost preposterous that the handful of Red Army survivors and Chuikov's 62nd Army were able to hold out against the entire German 6th Army. A couple of factors come into play. Firstly, Paulus was not the ideal commander. He was the replacement to Walther von Reichenau (who died of a heart attack) who was by many accounts a far better general. Secondly, when the Luftwaffe bombed Stalingrad to ruble, the Germans were not able to bing their decessive weapon (the tank) into the battle. Lastly, the Soviet defenders were fighting out of desperation. Whereas before, they might have withdrawn in the face of overwhelming German attacks. Stalin's "not a step back" order and the use of blocking attachments to shoot anyone trying to retreat gave the Red Army soldiers two grim choices, stand and fight until killed by the Germans or get shot by their own soldiers.

I would have to review the history of the war in some detail to give an opinion on the point at which a rational man (Hitler not being one) would have realized that it was time to sit down and negotiate.

But as for Stalingrad and the general campaign in the Soviet Union: while what you write about Paulus, the inability to bring tanks into the battle, and desperation is all true, as is the "not a step back order," it behooves those of us interested in history's lessons not to forget another factor. Regardless of one's personal view of the Soviet Union, we should not underestimate how powerful a motivator it is to fight for an ideal. At that point, most Russians still believed in the October Revolution (even if only in the abstract, and despite the political terror wrought by Stalin and the failure of the leadership to provide most basic necessities for people) and considered that a Nazi victory would be the equivalent of returning the country to czarist-like rule. There are, according to historians (and not only apologists for Stalin), at least as many, if not quite a few more, stories of amazing determination and heroism on the part of the rag-tag fighters left in Stalingrad and elsewhere on the Eastern Front as there are of the "grim choices" you mention being played out.

I am curious, tslust: what compelled you to pose the initial question in particular (besides "all that talk about Hitler on the political landscape thread")?

[tslust]

I would have to review the history of the war in some detail to give an opinion on the point at which a rational man (Hitler not being one) would have realized that it was time to sit down and negotiate.

But as for Stalingrad and the general campaign in the Soviet Union: while what you write about Paulus, the inability to bring tanks into the battle, and desperation is all true, as is the "not a step back order," it behooves those of us interested in history's lessons not to forget another factor. Regardless of one's personal view of the Soviet Union, we should not underestimate how powerful a motivator it is to fight for an ideal. At that point, most Russians still believed in the October Revolution (even if only in the abstract, and despite the political terror wrought by Stalin and the failure of the leadership to provide most basic necessities for people) and considered that a Nazi victory would be the equivalent of returning the country to czarist-like rule. There are, according to historians (and not only apologists for Stalin), at least as many, if not quite a few more, stories of amazing determination and heroism on the part of the rag-tag fighters left in Stalingrad and elsewhere on the Eastern Front as there are of the "grim choices" you mention being played out.

I am curious, tslust: what compelled you to pose the initial question in particular (besides "all that talk about Hitler on the political landscape thread")?

I heard a memorable quote, "We [the Russians] were given the choice of two dictators, we chose the one who could speak Russian."

I remember speaking with a retired military man. He said "amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics". That got me to thinking about Rommel's campaign in North Africa. Then I started looking at the European Theatre as a whole.

[tslust]

If Hitler hadn't invaded Russia or started the Battle of Britain (the precurser to Operation Sea Lion-the German invasion of Britain) he might have acheived "victory" by keeping what he had conquered up until then. (virtually all of Europe, North Africa, etc) Hitler didn't relish invading Britain, so its possible that they might have reached an agreement or stalemate at least.
After Dunkirk, the Brits and Allies (before the US joined) were pretty beaten up. (But of course not defeated)

As long as Churchill was Prime Minister, it is hard to conceive of Britian negotiating anything with Hitler. In fact Hitler had hoped that the British would've sued for peace after the fall of France. However with the U-boat campaign in the Atlantic, the British were nearly brought to their knees. At one point, even with rationing, they were down to just three months of food left.

While all this was going on, the "Phony War', the fall of France, the Battle of Britian, Hitler and Stalin had a 10 year non-aggression pact that (on the surface) Stalin had no intention of breaking. In some schools of thought along with sketchy evidence, the Soviets were planning and preparing an invasion of Germany. Therefore, according to them, Operation Barbarossa was a pre-emptive attack.

[smc]

... While all this was going on, the "Phony War', the fall of France, the Battle of Britian, Hitler and Stalin had a 10 year non-aggression pact that (on the surface) Stalin had no intention of breaking. In some schools of thought along with sketchy evidence, the Soviets were planning and preparing an invasion of Germany. Therefore, according to them, Operation Barbarossa was a pre-emptive attack.

I think that Stalin's theory of "socialism in one country" precludes that he would have invaded Germany. Everything he did -- from the non-aggression pact with Hitler to the betrayal of the Spanish Republic -- was done in the context of the practical application of that theory. It is where "peaceful coexistence" comes from. Trotsky's book The Revolution Betrayed, published in 1937, is a remarkable scientific analysis of Stalin's theory and how it spelled the ultimate end of the Soviet Union.

[TracyCoxx]

I've read from multiple sources saying that the failures at Stalingrad, Kursk or even Normady were the "death nail" Wehrmacht. I believe it was the failure to capture Moscow, in 1941.

It can probably be traced to their belief that they were invincible, which fueled their ambition and had them taking on Russia. Because they took on so many countries they were over extended and yes, their defeat was inevitable at that point.

[tslust]

I believe that war between Hitler and Stalin was inevitable. In his book, Hitler outlined that he thoufht that Germany should expand to the East (through European Russia) to achieve "living space". Furthermore, while the Wehrmacht was conducting operations in the Balkans, the Soviets seized the Baltic States. Then Stalin moved the entire available army out of its defences along the borders and took up positions in the newly annexed territory. Either they were planning an invasion of Germany or perhaps they thought they could [in the advent of war] stop any German attacks inside the new territories and leave Russia untouched.